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Avant-propos de D. Druckman

Daniel Druckman est professeur à l'Université George Mason (Etats-Unis), à l'Institut de l'Analyse et de la Résolution des Conflits de Queensland à Brisbane (Australie). Il est professeur visitant à la Nationale Yunlin University of Science and Technology de Taiwan. Il a occupé des postes élevés dans plusieurs institutions de recherche et d'enseignement ; il est membre du (ou appartient au) comité de rédaction de huit revues scientifiques. Il a obtenu plusieurs distinctions dont, en 2003, celle du « Lifetime Achievement » de l'IACM (International Association for Conflict Management) et celle du meilleur ouvrage dans l'analyse des conflits et de la négociation pour « Doing Research : Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis » (2005).

Christophe Dupont's book heralds the considerable achievements of scholars who have devoted a good deal of their careers to the study of negotiation. Although many of these scholars are from universities in the United States, the American influence should not be over-estimated: Dupont does a good job in documenting the important contributions made by non-Americans and, particularly, by French researchers. Nor should it be under-estimated: The field flourished with the inaugural issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR) published at the University of Michigan in 1957. On the heels of this new publication, a number of compelling insights appeared. These included Thibaut and Kelley's (*The Social Psychology of Groups*, 1959) concepts of comparative level for alternatives (preceding the idea of a best alternative to a negotiated agreement [BATNA]), Schelling's (*The Strategy of Conflict*, 1960) tacit bargaining and focal points (appearing initially in the JCR), Siegel and Fouraker's (*Bargaining Behavior*, 1960) levels of aspiration, and Douglas' 1957 JCR article on bargaining phases. It is not surprising that these ideas came from four different disciplines – social psychology, economics, management science, and industrial relations. The development of this field as an inter-disciplinary pursuit mirrors the mix of its pioneers.

A result of the mix is variety in the approaches taken by researchers. The approaches can be understood in terms of metaphors. Game and decision theorists regard negotiation as a puzzle to be solved. From the different preferences for outcomes, opposing negotiators search for a solution that satisfies or optimizes the outcomes or “payoffs.” Raiffa's applications of decision theory are good examples of this metaphor (for example, *The Art and Science of Negotiation*, 1982). Many social psychologists construe negotiation as though it were a bargaining game. Bargaining behavior was shown to be influenced by a number of features of the experimental situation. Sawyer and Guetzkow's 1965 framework (in Kelman's *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*) defined these features and many of them surface as explanatory variables in the rash of books published in the late 1970s. For organizational theorists, negotiators are representatives of large groups who face a challenge of managing relations among them. Walton and McKersie's (*A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations*, 1965) idea of the boundary role conflict captures this challenge. This idea was a forerunner to the later work on two-level games in international politics. For international relations theorists, negotiation is part of a larger context of diplomatic politics. For many students of negotiation, this metaphor can be traced to Ikle's 1964 book, *How Nation's Negotiate*. His typology of negotiating objectives is a lasting contribution that continues to receive attention in the empirical literature. Each of these approaches is well represented in chapter 4 of this book.

The number of metaphors can be expanded to include other approaches that have guided the work of negotiation theorists. In his 1977 book (*Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order*), Strauss called attention to the role played by negotiation in creating and sustaining

social orders. The focus here is on cooperative arrangements or regimes that serve to regulate interactions in such areas as trade, the environment, or security. This is part of a more general sociological or structural approach discussed by Dupont and favored by many of the French writers on negotiation. Emerging literatures on identity politics and discourse analysis have influenced the way we think about negotiation as well. Reflecting changes in world politics, the identity metaphor is an attempt to capture internal conflicts over issues of autonomy and independence. The issues are intangible, emotional, and ideological – the very features that have long been regarded as being “non-negotiable.” (See the 2001 special issue of *International Negotiation* on “Negotiating Identity.”) Focusing on the construction of meaning through communication, the discourse metaphor highlights the importance of subjective elements in negotiation. Much can be learned about negotiation by analyzing the way negotiators individually and jointly develop narratives (or stories) about their needs, preferences, and desires. These metaphors reflect and shape the post-modern era that Dupont discusses in chapter 6.

A field’s maturity can be measured by the extent to which the phenomenon of interest can be modeled. In this regard, the study of negotiation has achieved a certain amount of maturity. It has progressed from concepts and metaphors to rather precise models. Most notable perhaps are the modeling efforts of game theorists and decision analysts discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The ideas of Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality as well as the bargaining frontier are popular solution metrics. With regard to negotiating process or dynamics several recent developments should be mentioned. These include negotiation support systems, stochastic models, and computer modeling of system dynamics. Advances in electronic decision aids have contributed to the resolution of impasses. Building on Coleman’s earlier work on *The Mathematics of Collective Action* (1973), stochastic modeling shows promise for identifying transition rates that signal stage changes or turning points during the negotiating process. Sophisticated computer modeling has enhanced our understanding about the way that policy-making groups progress toward consensual decisions. These non-linear models are particularly useful for identifying shifts from contentious to problem-solving behavior within negotiating delegations. We look forward to further advances in each of these domains.

The maturity of a field is also assessed by progress in developing and applying empirical methodologies. By this measure, negotiation analysis is quite mature. A sense of the multi-method flavor of this field is given in chapter 5. Long and vibrant traditions of experiments and case studies have characterized this field. Dupont has been an active contributor to case study analysis. Both these methodologies have progressed with the design of increasingly complex simulations and more analytically rigorous case studies. Experimentally-based knowledge about negotiation has enlightened us about situation-process-outcome relationships; case studies have provided insights about the larger contexts within which negotiation occurs. For both approaches, content analysis has been a valuable tool, particularly when used to compare findings from experiments to cases or between different kinds of cases. A trend in the direction of combining experiments with case studies is evident. So too have more studies appeared that combine large-N quantitative with small-n qualitative approaches. The quantitative studies – including time-series analysis – are useful for establishing relationships between variables; the qualitative studies – including focused comparisons – are useful for discerning the mechanisms responsible for the obtained relationships. The increasing sophistication of research on negotiation – taking advantage of developments in methodology – portends a new era of scholarship.

Along side the explosion of experimental studies is an increased body of work on domain-specific negotiations. Studies abound on the way that security issues are negotiated between and within nations, on peace agreements, on multilateral trade talks, on conferences that address environmental issues, on attempts to seek freedom for hostages, on regional organizations and regimes, and on the role of cultural factors. The contributions made by these studies include further understanding of the processes and politics of the domain as well as an evaluation of the relevance of

concepts such as negotiating stages, the strategic use of alternatives, integrative agreements, and turning points. Many of these types of studies are discussed in this book.

The popularity of negotiation analysis is due in large part to three collaborative international programs. Each of these programs has contributed to the growth of the field by providing opportunities for publication. The Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria has produced a large number of edited books on a wide range of topics including, most recently, peace and justice, escalation and negotiation, and diplomatic games. Christophe Dupont has been an active contributor to these books. The Washington Interest in Negotiation (WIN) group has edited the Journal *International Negotiation* for a decade. Bridging theory and practice, the 30 thematic issues produced to date showcase the work being done by most scholars in the field. The Project on Negotiation (PON) at the Harvard Law School has published the *Negotiation Journal* for two decades. Among its many contributions the Journal has regularly published insightful analyses of both domestic and international cases, as well as theory papers, teaching approaches, and research digests.

The impetus for the study of negotiation comes also from the world of practice. An increased demand for skill development stems from several developments. One is the growth of the profession. Whereas formerly negotiation functions were practiced primarily by diplomats and those with responsibilities for representing large organizations in collective bargaining, it is now a commonplace career path in a wide variety of public and private organizations. Another development is the rise of executive training programs pioneered by entrepreneurs such as Chester Karrass (*Give & Take: The Complete Guide to Negotiating Strategies and Tactics*, 1974) and Gerard Nierenberg (*How to Read a Person Like a Book*, 1971) or by faculties of schools of management. A parallel increase in diplomatic academies and colleges connected officially and unofficially with governments' foreign ministries has provided opportunities for advancement in the Foreign Service. These socializing experiences have also encouraged the emergence of professional sub-cultures of negotiators. A third development is the publication of popular books such as Fisher and Ury's *Getting to Yes*. (1981). These books, based less on research than on practical experience, have produced a shared lexicon for talking about negotiating. Considered side-by-side with vibrant research programs, these contributions have engendered widespread interest in the topic. And, there may be no better person for capturing this field than Christophe Dupont, the quintessential practitioner-turned-scholar.

On a personal note, I recall my first interaction with Christophe. It occurred in the late 1980s during a meeting at IIASA. He asked what I had been working on lately, commenting that he missed my writing on negotiation in recent years. Indeed I had been spending more time on other topics while building a consulting practice in Washington, DC. His remark caused me to reflect on this change of interest. I realized that I had been away from the negotiation literature for too long. Returning "home" in the early 1990s, I have not looked back. My research contributions, stimulated in part by the time I spent at IIASA's PIN project, led to the development of an approach to negotiation training that incorporates research findings. Christophe picked up on our 1998 article (appearing in *International Negotiation*) on this approach. This then led to an active collaboration including a recent joint training seminar at Negocia in Paris. So, thanks Christophe for setting me on the right path, thanks for the collaboration, and, most of all, for turning to scholarship after a long and distinguished career as a practitioner in International Organizations. We have all benefited from your second career. This book provides a portrait drawn on both an historical and contemporaneous canvass. French-language readers will no doubt profit from the review. It is hoped that other language communities will also have an opportunity to benefit from this useful synthesis of ideas, models, and research findings.

Daniel Druckman
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